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Introduction
This paper discusses the interests of Indonesia in the agricultural negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of the WTO. It uses a global model of trade and production to quantitatively assess the possible effects of a successful Doha round on the world and on the Indonesian economy.
Since the start of the Doha round in 2001 the scope for liberalization in agricultural trade has gradually declined. The recent 'July 2004 package' reveals that WTO members agree on far reaching exemptions from reforms in individual products (special products for developing countries and sensitive products for developed countries). The ambitions on reforming domestic support in OECD countries seem to be moderate, at best, and a number of developing countries is less inclined to open their markets through improved access. It is against this background that we formulate our DDA scenario.
Several recent studies have shown that agricultural market access is one of the most important issues on the Doha development-round agenda (e.g. Anderson, 2004; Bouët et al 2004b; World Bank, 2003) . There is much focus on tariff reductions in the present paper. Section 2 provides background to the Doha Development Agenda, and provides input into the discussions on formulae through an analysis at tariff-line level. We find that any formula that reduces post-UR bound rates by less than 80 per cent will leave most currently applied tariffs on agricultural imports into Indonesian untouched. Stated otherwise, Indonesia brings much capital to the negotiation table when it comes to improving other countries' access to its markets.
The GTAP model and database are geared to an analysis that provides most detail on the agricultural sectors in Indonesia, and the South and East Asian region (section 3). While the impact of the Doha Development Agenda on global income is modest, as reported in section 4, Indonesia is one of the countries that reap aboveaverage gains driven by the improved export performance in agriculture. The income form farming activities will rise. The export opportunities compensate by far the limited contraction of the rice and sugar sectors that occur as imports grow; designating rice a Special Product will counteract contraction at modest costs (section 5). Criteria design for SPs is a potential deadlock, however, that may consume much of the scarce negotiating resources that developing countries have at their disposal. Section 6 concludes that there are firm interests for Indonesia in the Doha Development Agenda. Some are on the defensive side, aimed at conserving flexibility for protectionist policies. Others are on the offensive side, and relate to the realization of export potential through domestic transformation of agriculture, and improved access to export markets.
The three pillars and protection in Indonesia
The Doha Development Round aims to obtain "substantial improvement of market access, reduction of all export subsidies, in view of their progressive withdrawal, and substantial reduction of domestic support having effects on trade distortion". These are the three "pillars" in the agriculture negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda: market access concerns reductions in tariffs and tariff rate quotas; domestic support concerns commitments to reduce trade-distorting farm income policies; export competition concerns the promotion of agricultural exports through direct subsidies, export credits, subsidy element in food aid and state trading enterprises.
Domestic support
Domestic support to agriculture is monitored in the WTO according to the concept of the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), and member countries have agreed to bind and reduce their domestic support in the last multilateral trade round, the Uruguay Round (UR). The domestic support ceilings have never been binding since the UR for any member, partly due to the relatively soft definition of AMS that allows reallocation of expenditures between categories. Most importantly, a significant part of domestic support has been shifted to the so-called 'Green box' which contains support that is considered minimally trade distorting and is not subject to reductions. Similarly, the so-called 'blue box', used mainly by the EU, has not been subject to reductions, and might possibly be extended in the DDA. Bringing down AMS will, therefore, not always result in actual reduction in domestic support. Table 1 provides data on the subsidies from farm-income policies and export competition for selected countries and regions. These data are drawn from the OECD's estimates of producer support and adjusted to fit the GTAP database.
1 A negative number refers to a net tax on producers in that sector. It is evident that the European Union, North America (USA and Canada), Japan an Korea choose to subsidize their agricultural sectors, while most of the developing countries are taxing their farmers. Under the Uruguay Round (UR) only direct subsidies were subject to discipline.
While taking the removal of subsidies further, the DDA also addresses indirect forms of subsidization through various forms of institutional arrangements. These include food aid, officially supported export credits and state trading enterprises (STEs). The
General Council decision (WTO, 2004) Achterbosch et al. (2004) .
Patterns of border protection in Indonesia
The current pattern of border protection in Indonesia, its profile of bound rates and its profile of applied rates determine the potential impact of the specific tariff reduction modalities that are to be agreed in the Doha negotiations. For Indonesia we observe that its applied protection is low on average, around 5 per cent in agri-food and slightly higher in manufacturing and textiles. We also see that the protection afforded is lower than the protection faced by Indonesian exporters, which points to potential export revenue gains from a multilateral reduction of tariffs.
Below we present data obtained from the AMAD database, which contains information on bound ad valorem tariff rates in agriculture, as well as information on TRQs. 2 The bound rates are directly from Indonesia's commitment schedule, and the AMAD database contains 1331 Indonesian tariff lines at the HS-10 level. Figure 1 provides a picture of the tariff landscape. With the exception of a few peaks, the landscape is rather flat, with most bound tariffs in the range 40 -60 per cent. The important exceptions are found in dairy, sugar, rice and beverages. See table 2-3 for summary statistics for the agricultural commodities only, and calculated at the HS-2 group level. We also estimate the current binding overhang, i.e. the difference between bound rates and the post-UR applied rates. The overhang is very large indeed and this reflects the fact that Indonesia has reduced its tariffs far below the UR commitments in the wake of the Asia crisis. The current low rates reflect an already liberal trade regime, with most tariffs around 5 per cent. Two exceptions are sugar and rice where specific tariffs are applied, and in the case of rice also quantitative import restrictions. Another exception is (alcoholic) beverages.
The DDA negotiations on agriculture have introduced several approaches to achieve tariff reform. The European Union has favoured a Uruguay Round approach in its agricultural proposals, which defines as the goal an average cut in tariffs. The
Uruguay Round has in practice lead to the outcome that larger cuts were applied to tariffs that were already relatively low, while applying only modest reductions to high tariffs.
The USA and the CAIRNS group have proposed a formula approach. The fundamental difference to a UR approach is that a formula approach sets out rules to cut tariffs on each tariff-line. Specifically, these countries proposed to apply a Swiss formula approach on account that it achieves higher proportional cuts in higher tariff Source: Bound rates are from AMAD database, Applied rates have been obtained from Departemen Pertanian. Calculations LEI Notes: Mean values per HS-2 group calculated from tariff-line data at HS-10 level; (*) For rice the bound rate includes estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. The column "applied rate" only contains the average of ad applied valorem tariffs. The current applied specific tariff is Rp 430/kg. At current world prices and exchange rates this is roughly 20% ad valorem. (**) For sugar the bound rate includes estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. The column "applied rate" only contains the average of applied ad valorem tariffs. The current applied specific tariff is Rp 700/kg for raw sugar (p 550/kg for cane sugar). At current world prices and exchange rates this amounts to roughly 30% ad valorem.
Model, data and scenarios

Scenarios
The challenge in constructing scenarios is to translate bound rates and bound AMS ceilings, which are negotiated under DDA, into changes to the applied levels that can be incorporated in the modeling analysis. As usual one has to make simplifying assumptions to capture the spirit of the likely set of policy changes without being trapped into the details of the (legal) agreements. Our analysis of the impact of the DDA on the world and on Indonesia is structured around one central DDA scenario, which assumes the following with regard to the three pillars in the agricultural negotiations: -Market access: 30% reduction of applied levels of protection; -Domestic support: 5% reduction of applied levels; -Export subsidy: 75% reduction
This scenario purports to reflect the current stance in the negotiations:
substantial progress in market access albeit less in applied rates than in bound rates;
limited progress on domestic support -despite strong commitments to lower AMS ceilings, perhaps -as the EU and the USA strive to expand the definition of the blue box and put increasing amounts of support in the green box; finally, we believe that very substantial reductions of export subsidies can be achieved in this round.
In one of the scenarios we construct a potential modality for SP in developing countries along two lines. First, we see little fundamental difference between "sensitive products" proposed by OECD countries, and special products in developing countries. Special or sensitive are taken to be those products for which current levels of (bound) border protection are high. Second, we largely exempt sensitive/special products within this tariff range from liberalization by assuming a "symbolic" 5 per cent cut on applied support or border measures. The welfare changes are measured by the equivalent variation. This tells us how much money can be taken away from the representative household, or must be given to the representative household, to make it as well off as without the policy change. In practice, the equivalent variation correlates with changes in real GDP. We also report changes in farming income. This is measured as change in value added derived from agricultural activities, and hence excludes income from off-farm activities that the rural household may be engaged in.
Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels. Production taxes are placed on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. Some trade taxes are modeled at the border. Additional internal taxes can be placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Trade policy instruments are represented as import or export taxes/subsidies. A detailed discussion of the basic algebraic model structure of the GTAP model can be found in Hertel (1997) . Our model is implemented in GEMPACK, a software package designed for solving large applied general equilibrium models. The model is solved as an explicit non-linear system of equations, through techniques described by Harrison and Pearson (1996) . The GTAP database contains economy-wide information 87 regions or individual countries and information on 57 commodities. For the purposes of this study we have aggregated those into 11 regions and 10 commodities, listed in Table 3 . 
Impact of the Doha Development Agenda
As negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) proceed, the prospects for strong economic benefits from the round get bleaker. Below we report on the results of our model simulations under a realistic Doha scenario.
Global Effects
On the global level, we estimate gains of USD 11 billion in agriculture, and of The Impact of the Doha Round on Indonesia
Trade theory is straightforward in predicting that the gains from global liberalization accrue to those countries that remove their own distortions. Yet, Indonesia has quite a liberal trade regime, and few public means are allocated to support agricultural production or exports. This explains why the Doha round does little to boost Indonesian GDP (figure 2).
Comparing the impact on Indonesia with the rest of ASEAN, what strikes is that the gain in the latter region from countries opening up their markets is about four times bigger. Basically, the other ASEAN countries are able to materialize more export gains than Indonesia. The implication is that Indonesia -being a part of the global trading system -should aim to fulfill more of its export potential in order to derive firm benefits from the system. In addition, we see that Indonesia reaps indirect benefits from participating in a global liberalization effort. The matter returns below.
First, we zoom in on the results of DDA reform for Indonesia. In Indonesia most food crops are largely unaffected, and there is a substantial expansion in food production. For rice the share of domestic rice in consumption decreases slightly as a result of import growth of 20 per cent. Imports of sugar, already about half of domestic consumption, grow by an additional 10 per cent. The decline in rice and sugar farming allows resources to move into animal production and the oilseed/vegetable oil production, which both expand by 3 to 6 per cent.
Looking just at quantities of output, there is 2.5 per cent growth in oilseeds and animal products, and over 6 per cent in vegetable oil.
The opportunities in animal products and vegetable oil relate to policy changes in Japan and Korea, which open up the highly protected market for rice, grains and oilseeds in these regions. ASEAN countries and North America fill the gap. More resources in these countries are absorbed by rice production, which opens up opportunities for Indonesia to increase its share on world markets for oilseed crops and vegetable oil. As the EU, Japan and Korea reduce their strong policies on dairy, beef and other animal products, Indonesia can be among the countries that expand their livestock sectors, albeit in strong competition with Brazil, Oceania, and other ASEAN countries.
Below we discuss in more detail the impact on agriculture of a DDA reform that covers only agriculture and food.
Farm income. There will, of course, be a consequent adjustment in the revenues from farming over the various sectors. Figure 4 provides detail on the changes to real farmer income from a DDA reform, and to the drivers of change. 3 Regarding the level of farm income, we find strong losses in the OECD countries that result from reduced levels of trade-distorting support; losses are fully compensated, however, through increased support under the Green Box. Farmers in emerging Asia -Indonesia included -gain under DDA, largely because of increased prices for their output (table   4) . The results for Indonesia have to be interpreted with care because farming is often a part-time activity. In the lowland and upland area the share of agricultural (and fishing) activities in income is just about 50 per cent, in the coastal area it is just onethird. 4 We report on changes to the income from farming activities only, and exclude the returns from fishing activities from the analysis. It will be clear that a proper analysis of the household impact from trade liberalization will have to include the effect on off-farm income.
We find that average real income from farming (all activities) in Indonesia could increase by 1.2 per cent after the DDA reform of global agricultural policies. For the potential gain to materialize, farmers will need to shift resources into the production of vegetable oil and animal products. The decomposition of the total change allows us to pinpoint the policies that drive change. Keep in mind our scenario design! The reduction of export subsidies and domestic support bears little impact outside the EU and Oceania. Nonetheless, Indonesian farmers benefit from rising market prices for their rice and oilseeds -as support policies become less distorting or decline, supply contracts, and prices rise.
Increased market access is the biggest cause of adjustments worldwide. Indonesian export opportunities improve under the Asian rice domino; when Japan and Korea open up their markets for rice from the ASEAN region, Indonesian farmers get opportunities to step up their exports of animal products and vegetable oil, and take over market share from other ASEAN countries in these products. We find that a removal of protection on Indonesian agriculture slightly reduces farm income by about 0.4 per cent, a reflection of the minor contraction in rice and sugar production.
Most rural households are net buyers of food, i.e. consumption outweighs household supply. Although real farm income rises, the net impact on the rural household is likely to be negative. The income gain is partially based on the upward pressure on prices for agricultural products. The net impact in the household depends on their food balance. Hertel et al. (2004) show that poor agricultural households in Indonesia are likely to witness a net income drop in the face of global liberalization, as their food budget rises without being fully compensated by rising remuneration for their activities. Source: model simulations Employment and wages. Before we discuss the impact of reform on employment and wages, first a note on the specification of the labor market in the GTAP analysis. In the analysis we assume full employment of labor resources at all times in the analysis. This reflects our hypothesis that trade reform will not increase total demand for labor. 5 In the agricultural economy in Indonesia, chances are bigger that trade reform will alter the structure of labor demand than its volume, basically because the labor force is already fully employed in farm and off-farm activities. The output changes reported above will affect the distribution over sectors. In addition, we expect the distribution of labor over the formal and informal economy to change, an effect that we cannot quantify.
We find that labor demand shifts follows the shifts in agricultural production,
i.e. a slight reduction of the demand for labor in rice and sugar farming (and the processing of these crops) by less than 1 per cent; substantial increases of 2.5 to 4.5 per cent in the sectors vegetable oil and animal products. The agricultural economy specializes more into the supply of vegetable oil and animal products, which require more land and capital per unit of product, and less labor than rice and sugar. By consequence, wages decrease somewhat in comparison to wage levels in ASEAN and other East Asian regions, which experience the inversed output trend. In Indonesia the increase of land rents by 1 per cent transfers income from land laborers to land owners. As trade theory predicts, the reduced border protection on manufactures results in a decline of domestic capital prices. The decline is partly undone by an increased demand for capital from agriculture.
The realization of potential gains. The results indicate that a key challenge to Indonesia is to improve export performance in agriculture. Globally, enterprises in the food sector have incorporated consumer concerns and regulatory demands regarding health, quality and the environment into their production, marketing and distribution activities. The core of large retailers and trans-national "agribusiness" corporations has introduced various technical specifications that govern quality and safety of local and imported food products, e.g. the guidelines from EurepGAP and British Retail Consortium. 6 As tariffs decline in global food trade, such technical standards that importers impose become the more impeding trade barriers. They were once skillfully described as 'the emerging rocks in the ebbing tide.'
The organizational response has generally been to integrate buyers and sellers within so-called supply chains, which is controlled by the dominant link in the chain.
In many cases this requires direct investments of the controlling link into the primary stages of production. For such chains to reach out to agriculture in Indonesia requires quality and stability of supply, and a sound investment climate. The constructive attitude towards liberalization under the WTO signals a drive towards openness in Indonesia, which improves investment climate. Such intangible benefits from the WTO will support the value adding in agriculture through processing and exports.
Exempting SPs from multilateral liberalization
In the previous section we looked at the effects of a possible outcome of the Doha round, but without taking into account the important issue of 'special products'.
Members agreed in the July package that "Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. These products will be eligible for more flexible treatment. The criteria and treatment of these products will be further specified during the negotiation phase and will recognize the fundamental importance of Special Products to developing countries."
At the same time, developed country members are also granted considerable leeway by allowing them so-called 'sensitive products' that will also receive a more 'flexible' treatment with regard to market access commitments:
"Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered approach, Members may designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as sensitive, taking account of existing commitments for these products."
Developed countries will designate those products 'sensitive' that are currently subject to regulated trade under tariff rate quota (TRQ). The text speaks of no justification in the case of sensitive products. By contrast, developing countries will have to justify the designation of SPs according to food security, rural development, and similar considerations. Criteria design is a potential deadlock, however, that will draw heavy on the Geneva delegations of developing countries. Instead these might want to propose self-designation of SPs, quite in line with the approach of developed countries.
At this point it is difficult/impossible to foresee the outcomes on SPs. Still, we have undertaken to estimate the possible effects of exempting products from liberalization efforts. The coarse nature of our commodity aggregation limits the choice of products. In the simulation experiment, we therefore allow each region to designate at most one product as SP.
In order to arrive at some general principles for designation of SPs, we have used two simple indicators: (i) the existing level of border protection. Assuming that existing protection patterns reveals countries' preferences as to what they see as products that deserve protection, we select those agricultural products that currently have the highest applied tariffs. This indicator is combined with (ii) the outputweighted contribution to total farm income. This indicator should reveal the importance of the commodity concerned for rural incomes, and we choose those products that contribute the highest shares. All this leads us to a rather simple list: for all the Asian countries we assume rice to be a special product, except for India, where we assume vegetable oils to be of particular importance; the EU is very likely to continue some form of restrictive sugar policies, in spite of recent moves towards reforms of the EU sugar regime; for North America and South-and Central America we assume animal products to be special; finally, Brazil, the Oceania region and our heterogeneous 'rest of world' are not assumed to designate SPs.
Modelling SPs. Our implementation of SPs is very straightforward, and is certainly an oversimplified representation of what will eventually be negotiated in the Doha round: we simply assume that members choose not to liberalize policies in their SPs. That is, they do not commit to further reductions in market access barriers, and if applicable no reduction of domestic support and no reduction of export subsidies. Even more disturbing is the effect on real farm incomes. While farm incomes in Japan and Korea and in the EU25 would rise relative to the original scenario, the lowincome regions in our model would see a (very) slight, and negligible drop in their farming incomes. Hence, while high-income regions would transfer resources from consumers and citizens to farmers in sensitive products, farmers in low-income countries would not experience significant income gains from the exclusion of SPs.
The reason for this result is that the multilateral non-inclusion of products in the liberalization efforts hampers export opportunities for low-income countries. This is especially evident in the rice (JAKO) and sugar (EU25) case. To Indonesia, the decline in export opportunities due to SPs is insignificant in our model. 
Conclusions
This paper has employed a large-scale economic model to quantify potential interests of Indonesia in the agricultural negotiations under the Doha Development
Agenda. As with all such modeling studies the analysis represents an abstraction from many details and could be refined in various ways. From our analysis we can draw a number of conclusions.
Model results. Indonesia's quite liberal trade regime emerged in the wake of the financial crisis in Asia during the late 1990s. Given low applied protection in Indonesia, we estimate only small economy-wide welfare (efficiency) gains from own reforms. In fact, all effects of trade reform are rather small because the integration of Indonesian agriculture with global markets is quite limited. Small simulated drops in rice and sugar incomes are more than compensated through expansion in vegetable oils and animal products. Overall, this results in a small improvement of farmers'
incomes. The realization of these potential benefits depends on the ability to shift resources into these promising areas of agricultural production. Indonesia's active participation in the DDA might facilitate this process of change through its impact on the investment climate in the country. Safeguards are an alternative to requesting high bound tariffs for stabilization purposes. To the extent that Indonesia will be able to negotiate higher bound tariffs on some agricultural products, the case for a safeguard mechanism in addition is diminished. However, if bound rates come down then it might be worthwhile to consider safeguard mechanisms.
Offensive interests in the negotiations include: (i) Domestic support reduction by OECD is estimated to have small negative impacts on the net importing Indonesian economy through higher import prices. However, higher world sugar prices that would result from some reforms in OECD countries would support expansion of the sugar sector in Indonesia.
(ii) The simulations show a limited effect on Indonesia of improved market access to other countries. The limited realization of export potential is due to current specialization pattern. Diversification into first-stage processing to add value to primary products would lead to positive prospects in animal products and vegetable oils. (iii) If aggressive opening of other markets is attained, Indonesia will also have to lower its own bound rates, hence loosing some flexibility. This flexibility can be regained through pushing for a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and/or Special Products (SP). Alternatively, maintaining global protection levels would also leave Indonesia's flexibility untouched, but this comes at the cost of foregoing future benefits of opening markets.
